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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES, AND
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
by
DESSISLAVA VENELINOVA SLAVTCHEVA
Dissertation Committee
FABIO GHIRONI
FABIO SCHIANTARELLI MATTEO IACOVIELLO
My doctoral dissertation studies the interaction between nancial development,
exchange rate regimes and productivity growth.
The rst chapter provides a microfounded, quantitative model that rationalizes
recent empirical evidence by Aghion et al (2009), who nd that xed exchange rate
regimes lead to higher long-run productivity growth in countries with low nancial
development, while the eect in nancially developed countries is insignicant. The
channel that explains this evidence in my model is the following: A xed exchange
rate regime leads to lower ination when the money growth is otherwise high. In
turn, lower ination results in higher long-run productivity growth since nancial
intermediaries hold a fraction of deposits as reserves, whose return is lower than the
market rate and, thus, is aected by ination. The lower return paid on reserves
drives a wedge between the return paid on deposits and the return paid on loans
by reducing the former and increasing the latter. In turn, this reduces entry of new
innovators in the economy and, consequently, productivity growth. I show that the
negative eect of exible exchange rate regimes on growth is larger for countries with
lower levels of nancial development because ination and the fraction of deposits
held as reserves are higher in these countries.
In the second chapter, I perform panel-data analysis to nd how much of the eect
of exchange rate regimes on productivity growth, documented previously by Aghion
et al. (2009), can be accounted for by the channel proposed in the rst chapter of my
dissertation. I use data for 83 countries over the period 1960-2000. The data comes
from the Penn World Table, World Development Indicators, International Financial
Statistics, and the Reinhart and Rogo classication of exchange rate regimes. I
use the GMM system estimator and regress productivity growth on nancial devel-
opment, a variable describing the exchange rate regime, growth controls, as well as
bank reserve ratios. I nd that when the interaction eect of ination and nancial
development or the interaction of the reserve ratio and nancial development are
added to the regression used by Aghion et al. (2009), the exchange rate regime eect
on productivity growth in less nancially developed countries is no longer signicant.
This implies that the channel proposed in the rst chapter of my dissertation can
explain most of the initial empirical results.
The third chapter explores the short-run eect of exchange rate regimes on the
macroeconomic performance of a small open economy with endogenous productivity
growth and underdeveloped nancial markets when the home economy is subject to
shocks. I use the model introduced in the rst chapter, add nominal price rigidities,
and calculate impulse responses, given a productivity shock and a shock to the for-
eign nominal interest rate. I also calculate second moments implied by the model
and compare them to empirical second moments. The results show that after a pos-
itive exogenous productivity shock, productivity growth, output and consumption
increase more under the exible exchange rate regime. However, given an increase
in the foreign nominal interest rate, productivity growth falls but the reduction in
productivity growth is smaller under the xed exchange rate regime. In addition,
output and consumption fall after the shock, however, the reduction of consumption
and output is higher under the xed exchange rate regime. I also nd that after both
shocks analyzed here, welfare is higher under the xed exchange rate regime. The
model is also able to match some features of business cycles in developing countries.
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Chapter 1
Financial Development, Exchange Rate
Regimes and Productivity Growth
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1.1 Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime has been an important topic in economic policy
and research for a long time. Theoretical and empirical studies have tried to determine
whether xed or exible exchange rates mitigate nancial crises, lower consumption
or output volatilities, aect productivity growth or any other important aspects of the
performance of countries. The evidence and predictions of these studies are mixed.
Some have found that xed exchange rates are preferable, others exactly the opposite.
In terms of the eect of exchange rate regimes on productivity growth, no signicant
empirical relationship has been found in many of the studies. Among these are Baxter
and Stockman (1989) and Ghosh, Guilde, and Wolf (2002).
Recently, however, this view has been challenged by Aghion et al. (2009) who
performed a panel data study in which they showed that, when a country’s level of
nancial development is taken into account, the exchange rate regime matters for long-
run productivity growth. When the country has a low level of nancial development,
a exible exchange rate leads to lower productivity growth than a xed exchange
rate regime, while the eect is insignicant in nancially developed countries. These
results show that exchange rate regimes and productivity growth can be interrelated
and motivate me to explore channels that link the exchange rate regime, the level of
nancial development, and productivity growth.
The main objective of this paper is to provide a microfounded model that ratio-
nalizes the evidence presented by Aghion et al. (2009). My contribution is to specify
a microfounded general equilibrium small open economy model extended to include
productivity growth, which is the result of increase in the number of varieties of home
intermediate goods, and a nancial intermediary that holds reserves in order to satisfy
a reserve requirement and faces an asymmetric information problem in nancing the
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innovation activities of domestic entrepreneurs. Asymmetric information results in a
costly state verication problem, where the monitoring cost incurred by the interme-
diary is the proxy for nancial development. The important features of the model
that generate the results in the paper are the presence of reserves, high money growth
under a exible regime, and the increase of reserves and ination with reduction of
nancial development.
My model shows that exible or xed exchange rate regimes result in dierent
steady-state ination rates depending on the money supply growth rate observed un-
der exible exchange rates. I assume that purchasing power parity holds so that home
ination under the xed exchange rate regime equals foreign ination, which is low. I
nd that when domestic money supply growth under the exible exchange rate regime
is high, the home country’s ination rate under the exible exchange rate regime is
higher than the ination rate under the xed exchange rate regime. Furthermore, my
model predicts that lower ination results in higher long-run productivity growth.
Therefore, if a country has high money growth under the exible regime, ination
will fall and productivity growth will increase when the country switches to a xed
regime.
The reason why ination aects long-run productivity growth is that the nancial
intermediary in the model holds a fraction of deposits as reserves. Reserves are the
source of non-neutrality of money in the model as they earn a return that is lower
than the market rate and, thus, is aected by ination. The lower return paid on
reserves drives a wedge between the return paid on deposits and the return paid on
loans by reducing the former and increasing the latter. In turn, this increases the
repayment amount innovators have to pay, which reduces entry of new innovators
in the economy and, consequently, productivity growth. Both reserves and ination
increase the wedge between the return on deposits and loans and, therefore, both
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reserves and ination reduce productivity growth.
In addition, my model predicts that money growth under the exible regime and
the reserve ratio are high when nancial development is low and that they decrease
with nancial development. Under the exible exchange rate regime, the growth rate
of money supply and the fraction of reserves that the nancial intermediary holds are
endogenously determined by the government, which uses them as a source of seignior-
age revenue. They are set so that the government maximizes the discounted lifetime
utility of households, given that it receives a certain target amount of seigniorage
revenue which does not depend on nancial development. The model shows that the
optimal rate of ination and the reserve ratio are lower in more nancially devel-
oped countries because growth increases with nancial development, and, thus, the
seigniorage revenue that the government can receive for given values of reserves and
ination is higher when nancial development is higher. Therefore, in order to receive
the same seigniorage revenue when nancial development is higher, the government
needs to reduce the reserve ratio and ination. Under the xed exchange rate regime
home ination is the same as foreign ination, while the fraction of reserves is the
same as under the exible exchange rate regime. This explains why the growth dif-
ferences between a xed and a exible exchange rate regime are large when nancial
development is low and they decrease with nancial development, consistent with the
empirical evidence provided in Aghion et al. (2009).
Aghion et al. (2009) is the paper that is closest to mine. In addition to providing
empirical support for the eect of exchange rate regimes on growth, they have a
theoretical model that explains their results. They suppose that borrowing of credit
constrained rms is proportional to current earnings and, in the case of exchange rate
appreciation, current earnings are reduced, so that borrowing and innovation decrease.
When the exchange rate depreciates, the results are the opposite but the authors
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state that, in general, the two eects will not oset each other. The contribution
of my paper is that it shows another channel that can explain the empirical results.
Moreover, I use a microfounded, quantitative model and I can numerically evaluate the
eects present in this paper and perform welfare analysis. The current paper is also
more broadly related to papers modeling the long-run eect of ination on growth
such as Haslag (1998) and Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995). These papers show
that ination aects long-run growth because nancial intermediaries hold reserves
whose return is negatively related to the ination rate — the same channel through
which ination aects growth in my model. Also, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
and Brock (1989) introduce endogenous determination of reserves and ination and
show that governments use the reserve ratio as a base for the ination tax. They do
not, however, consider how nancial development aects the choice of reserves and
ination.
By incorporating the level of nancial development in the exchange rate-growth
nexus, my work is also related to the prolic literature on the link between nancial
development and growth. In particular, it is similar to endogenous growth models
such as Blackburn and Hung (1998) and De La Fuente and Marin (1996), where
nancial development mitigates information asymmetry problems between nancial
intermediaries and innovators and thus aects productivity growth. Also my model
generates results that are consistent with other empirical regularities. It has been
documented by many empirical studies that dierent exchange rate regimes imply
signicant dierences in ination performance (Husain et al. 2005, Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger 2001, 2003, Ghosh et al 2002, Bleaney and Francisco 2005). These stud-
ies show that countries with xed exchange rate regimes have lower ination rates
than countries with exible exchange rate regimes. In addition, another large part of
the macroeconomic literature has found that the long-run growth of countries is af-
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fected by the ination rate observed in these countries. Fischer (1991), Fischer (1993),
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Grier and Tullock (1989), and Barro (1995) show
that countries with higher ination rates exhibit slower long-run growth. Further-
more, Haslag (1998) shows that reserves and ination reduce growth and Haslag and
Koo (1999) show that reserves increase when nancial development is lower, and that
reserves and ination move together.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence that re-
serves and ination are negatively related to nancial development. Section 3 presents
the model. Section 4 shows the steady-state of the model and the calibration of the
parameters used in the model. Section 5 presents the results I obtain for the eect of
exchange rate regimes on growth, as well as the welfare results. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Stylized Facts
One of the main features of my model is that the representative nancial intermediary
holds a fraction of deposits as reserves, and this fraction, as well as ination, decrease
with nancial development. Here I present empirical evidence to justify these fea-
tures of the model. I collect cross-section data on nancial development, ination
and reserve ratios for 76 countries listed in the Appendix. Financial development is
measured as the ratio of private credit to GDP, which is the standard measure of
nancial development used in the literature. I follow Haslag (1998) in measuring the
reserve requirement ratio as the ratio of bank reserves over the sum of demand and
saving deposits in the International Financial Statistics data. I plot the relationship
between the reserve ratio and private credit/GDP in Figure 1. The gure shows that
when private credit/GDP increases, i.e., nancial development increases, the ratio of
reserves held by banks is reduced.
In this paper, the proxy for nancial development is the monitoring cost that
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the nancial intermediary incurs to monitor the borrowers due to the presence of
an asymmetric information problem between the borrowers and the intermediary. A
more developed nancial system is associated with lower monitoring cost. It is di-
cult to nd a good measure of the monitoring cost but an option suggested by Bose
and Murshid (2008) is to use the ratio of bank overhead costs to total assets. Higher
overhead costs imply lower bank eciency and hence lower nancial development
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2003). In Figure 2 I plot the bank overhead ratio versus pri-
vate credit to GDP to illustrate the negative relationship between overhead costs and
nancial development. This relationship implies that as the overhead ratio decreases,
the reserve ratio should decrease as well, and this is indeed what is observed in the
data. Figure 3 shows that as the bank overhead ratio is reduced, meaning that nan-
cial development is increased, the reserve ratio decreases. Therefore, the data shows
that the fraction of deposits held as reserves by nancial intermediaries decreases with
nancial development or, equivalently, increases when bank costs increase. Also, in
Figure 4 I show that ination and reserves move together in the data.1
1.3 The Model
The model incorporates productivity growth and a role for nancial development
in a standard small open economy model. Productivity growth is the result of an
increase in the number of varieties of intermediate goods as in Romer (1990) and
Grossman and Helpman (1989).2 The home country has ve types of agents: work-
ers, entrepreneurs, nal goods producers, a representative nancial intermediary, and
1Haslag and Koo (1999) perform regression analysis and provide additional evidence that reserves
and ination decrease with nancial development.
2An alternative productivity growth model would feature increases in the quality of goods as in
Aghion and Howitt (2000). The Romer (1990) model is used here because it is better suited for
quantitative analysis.
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the government. Workers in the home country supply labor, save, and consume home
and foreign tradable goods. Entrepreneurs produce home intermediate goods and in-
novate by increasing the number of varieties of intermediate goods. Final goods pro-
ducers combine competitively the intermediate goods produced by entrepreneurs into
a nal consumption bundle. The nancial intermediary links borrowers and lenders
by accepting deposits from workers and lending to entrepreneurs, keeping part of
the deposits as reserves in order to satisfy a reserve requirement. The nancing of
innovation is subject to an information asymmetry. To overcome the information
asymmetry in lending, the nancial intermediary monitors innovating entrepreneurs,
which entails a monitoring cost. The size of this cost represents the level of nan-
cial development of the country, where a high monitoring cost is associated with an
underdeveloped nancial system. The role of the government is to endogenously set
reserve requirements and determine monetary policy given the exchange rate regime
of the country.
1.3.1 Consumption and Price Indexes
The workers in the home country consume a consumption basket  composed of
home and foreign traded goods,  and  given by:
 =
h

1

1

 + (1 )
1

1


i 
1
 (1)
where   0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and 
is the share of the home good in the consumption basket.
The corresponding price index is:
 = [
1
 + (1 ) 1 ]
1
1  (2)
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where  and  are the prices of the home and foreign traded goods in terms of
the home currency. I assume that the law of one price and purchasing power parity
hold. The price of foreign goods in domestic currency is the nominal exchange rate
multiplied by the price of foreign goods in foreign currency:
 = 

 (3)
where  is the nominal exchange rate, and   is the foreign currency price of foreign
goods, which is assumed exogenous.
1.3.2 Home Country
Workers The workers at home consume the consumption basket , and supply
labor  at nominal wage rate 	. They also make domestic currency denominated
deposits 
 to the domestic nancial intermediary at a gross interest rate 1 +  paid
at  + 1 The objective of the workers is to choose  
 and  to maximize their
utility:
 = 
X
=0

³
ln  
2
2
´
 (4)
subject to the budget constraint:
 +
 	 + (1 + 1)
1 +  + (5)
where  are government transfers, and  are prots from ownership of the domestic
nancial intermediary. Log utility from consumption is chosen to ensure balanced
growth as shown by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
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The rst-order condition for labor supply is:
 =
	

 (6)
The consumption allocation is:


=

1 
μ


¶
 (7)
The Euler equation for deposits is:

"
(1 + )
μ
+1

¶1

+1
#
= 1 (8)
Final Goods Sector A representative rm in the nal good sector produces the
nal home good  using labor  and  dierent varieties of intermediate goods
() supplied by entrepreneurs indexed by . The production function is:
 = 
1

Z 	
0
()
 0    1 (9)
where  is exogenous productivity and  is labor used for production.3 The nal
good rm buys intermediate goods () and produces the nal good in order to
maximize prots, taking the price of intermediate goods () as given. This yields
the demand for intermediate good :
() =
()
1
1R 	
0
()

1
 (10)
3 is costant in steady state and does not aect the results in the paper.
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The demand for labor is:
 =
(1 )
	
 (11)
Endogenous growth is a result of increases in the number of intermediate goods
 In equilibrium, all intermediate goods are used in the same quantity and the
production function can be written as:
 = 
1
 
 = 
1
 ()
1  (12)
As shown by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2001), for given and ,  increases
with . This is a result of spreading the total of intermediate goods over the number
of varieties  If the increase in  is a result of increase in  for given 
there exist diminishing returns to each intermediate good
Entrepreneurs There are  entrepreneurs indexed by  Each entrepreneur pro-
duces one variety of intermediate goods using  units of the nal home good. The
number of intermediate good varieties increases as a result of costly innovation. In-
novation is conducted using labor 
(). Each entrepreneur has a probability of
successful innovation (
()) where  is a proxy for the disembodied quantity
of knowledge as in Blackburn and Hung (1996). I assume that 0(
())  0
and 00(
())  0, meaning that the probability of innovation increases with the
amount of research eort at a diminishing rate, as in Jones (1995) and Stokey (1995).
This specication of the probability of innovation allows for sustainable productivity
growth because 
() is constant on the balanced growth path. When the num-
ber of innovators increases, the demand for labor in research rises and, as a result,
the labor each individual innovator can hire decreases proportionately. Even though
each innovator employs less labor, the overall labor used by all innovators stays the
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same.4
Production of intermediate goods The entrepreneurs have perpetual
monopoly power over their variety. Their unit cost of production is 

. The real
prot generated by producing an intermediate good at time  is () and it equals
output revenues net of production costs. It is given by:
() =
()

() 

() (13)
The real expected discounted value of prots from + 1 on is:
 () = 
X
=+1
()
where   
³


´
is the discount factor. The entrepreneurs set the price of their
variety so as to maximize () +  () given the unit cost


 and the market
demand schedule for their product (10).
The optimal price is a markup 1

over marginal cost:
() =
1

 (14)
Entry The presence of positive prots () attracts  entrants to the inter-
mediate good sector during period . These entrepreneurs know that they need to
innovate successfully in period  in order to produce a new variety and earn prots
Production of the varieties invented during period  takes place in  + 1 Given the
probability of successful innovation (
()) only (
()) of the en-
4I follow Blackburn and Hung (1996) in the description of entrepreneurs and nancing of innova-
tion. They have a closed economy model that also uses the Romer (1990) growth model and costly
state verication. Their nancial intermediary, however, does not hold reserves.
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trants will survive and produce in period + 1 In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs are
identical and I can write the evolution of the number of rms as:
+1 =  + (
) (15)
Innovation During period  newly entering entrepreneurs hire labor to be used
for innovation. The cost of inventing new varieties is nanced by loans !() from
the nancial intermediary:
!() = "
() (16)
where " is the real wage. I assume that all external nance is in the form of the
loan !() obtained from the nancial intermediary because nancial frictions prevent
entrepreneurs from raising funds in an equity market. The expected net return from
innovation is:
(
())

+1

( ()#())
¸
 (17)
where #() is the loan repayment for entrepreneurs entering in period , and  ()
is the expected discounted prot of entrepreneur  dened above. In equilibrium,
(
())

+1

( ()#())
¸
= 0 (18)
i.e., there is free entry in the entrepreneurial sector until the expected present dis-
counted value of future prots is equated to the cost of innovating. The demand for
loans is obtained by maximizing (17) subject to the constraints of the loan contract
that will be described in the next section.
Financial Intermediary The nancial intermediary collects deposits from domes-
tic households and provides loans to domestic entrepreneurs who nance their inno-
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vations. The deposits and loans are denominated in domestic currency. In this model
the outcome of the innovation process is known to the entrepreneur but not known
to the nancial intermediary, so there is an agency problem between the intermedi-
ary and entrepreneurs. To overcome the agency problem, the intermediary solves a
costly state verication problem which requires that the intermediary pay a monitor-
ing cost in order to observe the realization of the innovation. As shown by Townsend
(1979) and Williamson (1987), the optimal contract in this case is a standard debt
contract. When the borrowers default, the intermediary monitors them. For loans
taken in period  the monitoring occurs in +1 When the borrowers do not default,
they repay #(). The repayment amount depends on the monitoring cost that the
intermediary incurs in bankruptcy states. In this paper the monitoring cost will be
used as a proxy for nancial development. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) nd that such costs are negatively correlated with -
nancial development. The reason for this is that high monitoring costs imply lower
bank eciency and, hence, lower level of nancial development.
The contract that overcomes the asymmetric information between the entrepre-
neurs and the intermediary maximizes the expected return to the borrower subject to
a participation constraint for the intermediary. Thus, the optimal contract determines

() to maximize (17) subject to
(
() )
+1

#() [1 (
() )]$!() = !()(1 +#+1) (19)
!() = "
() (20)
where $ is the monitoring cost of the nancial intermediary.5 Equation (17) shows
5The probability of monitoring in my model is 1 because the return to the borrower in the default
state is 0 and there is an incentive to misrepresent the outcome unless there is monitoring.
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that the expected return to the entrepreneur is the return to innovation in the non-
defaulting states minus the repayment amount. Equation (19) is the participation
constraint for the intermediary. It equates the repayment in the non-defaulting state
minus the monitoring cost incurred in the default state to the return to loans if no
asymmetric information problem were present, !()(1 +#+1)
The rst-order condition to the above maximization is given by:
0(
() ) [ ()
³
+1

´
+$"
()] =
"
h
(1 +#+1) + (1 (
() )$
i
 (21)
The amount of labor that the th innovator will use equates the expected marginal
cost and marginal revenue from innovating. The participation constraint (19) then
gives the repayment amount that the innovator should pay in the case of a success-
ful innovation. The return (1 + #+1) is determined by the intermediary’s prot
maximization.
Each period the intermediary receives deposits 
 from workers. A fraction 
of deposits are kept at the central bank as required reserves % while the rest of
the deposits are lent to entrepreneurs and earn real return (1 + #+1). The re-
quired reserves % do not earn interest so that the real return to holding reserves is
inversely related to ination.6 The reserve ratio  is determined endogenously by
the government, as described in Section 4. The reserve requirement implies that the
long-run growth rate of productivity & will depend on ination in steady state and,
thus, monetary policy will be non-neutral in the long-run. If no reserves are held
by intermediaries and all deposits are lent to borrowers, the long-run growth rate of
6Here, no interest is paid on reserves. Liviatan and Frish (2006) show that the government has
an incentive to pay interest on reserves only if there is unexpected ination. In the steady-state of
the model, there is no unexpected component to ination, so it is optimal not to impose interest on
reserves.
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the economy is independent of the ination rate and, therefore, independent of the
exchange rate regime. The reason why reserves lead to non-neutrality of ination is
that reserves earn a return that is lower than the market rate and aected by ina-
tion. The lower return paid on reserves drives a wedge between the return paid on
deposits and the return paid on loans by reducing the former and increasing the latter.
In turn, this increases the repayment amount innovators have to pay, which reduces
innovation and, consequently, growth. The wedge between the return on deposits
and loans increases when reserves and ination are higher. Therefore, both reserves
and ination reduce productivity growth. Introduction of reserves is an approach for
analyzing the long-run eect of ination on growth that has previously been used in
Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (1995) and Haslag (1998). In these papers the results
show that growth decreases with ination because the return on deposits is reduced,
and, thus, savings and investment are reduced.7
The nancial intermediary earns (1 + #+1) on loans, 1+1 on reserves and
repays (1 + '+1) to workers at time + 1 for deposits made at time . Therefore
the prots of the intermediary at time + 1 expressed in real terms are:
(1 +#+1)! +
%
+1
(1 + '+1) (22)
where    and 1 + '+1 = (1 + ) +1 is the gross real interest rate on deposits.
The intermediary chooses its portfolio of loans and reserves to maximize prots
subject to the feasibility constraint and the reserve requirement constraint:
%

+!   (23)
7An alternative approach to analyzing the long-run eect of ination on growth is to use a cash-
in-advance model. Reserves are an empirically more plausible mechanism for the purposes of this
paper.
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and
%

    (24)
Since reserves are rate-of-return dominated by loans, the reserve requirement con-
straint binds. As a result of the zero prot condition for the intermediary and equa-
tions (23) and (24) holding with equality,
(1 +#+1) =
(1 + '+1) (1+	+1)
1 
 (25)
The return to deposits (1 + '+1) is a weighted average of the return to loans
(1 + #+1) and the return to reserves 1(1+	+1) , where the weight is the reserve
requirement ratio  and 

 =

1
 1 is the ination rate The return to reserves
decreases with ination and, as a result, the return to deposits and the growth rate
of the economy in the steady state will decrease with ination.
1.3.3 Symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium all entrepreneurs make identical decisions, so I drop the
 subscript from the entrepreneur variables. Aggregate output is used for home and
foreign consumption, the monitoring cost [1(
11)]1$"1
1, and
for production of intermediate goods:
 =  + 

 + [1 (
11)]


1$"1
1 +  (26)
The total amount of loans in the economy plus the amount of reserves is equal to the
total amount of deposits:
! +
%

=  (27)
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The total amount of labor demanded is equal to total labor supply:
 +
 =  (28)
The government is assumed to obtain only seigniorage revenue and it rebates the rev-
enue to the households using lump-sum transfers. The government budget constraint
is:
( (1 =  (29)
where  is government revenue and( is money supply, which is determined by the
government and is described in the next section.
There is also balanced trade in equilibrium:8


 =  (30)
Finally, money demand equals money supply:
( = %  (31)
where money demand are the reserves % 
1.3.4 Government-Monetary Authority
The exchange rate regime is taken as exogenous and the role of the government is to
determine monetary policy given the exchange rate regime. The government conducts
monetary policy by controlling the money supply. In addition, the government sets
the required reserve ratio . This section describes the determination of monetary
policy and the reserve requirement ratio in the steady state. The endogenous choice of
8This assumption does not aect the results in the paper.
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money growth and reserves explains why the optimal fraction of reserves and money
growth under the exible exchange rate regime are higher when nancial development
is lower. This is necessary in order to show that xed exchange rate regimes lead to
higher long-run productivity growth in less nancially developed countries and that
the growth dierences between a xed and a exible exchange rate regime are reduced
as nancial development increases.
Flexible exchange rate regime Under the exible exchange rate regime, the
government determines the growth rate of money supply ) and the reserve ratio
 There are several papers in the literature that analyze why governments impose
reserve requirements and how these requirements are determined. Among these are
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Brock (1989), who show that governments use
the reserve ratio as a tax base for the ination tax, which is an important source of
tax revenue for governments in developing countries, where the income tax system
is inecient or there is substantial tax evasion. In these papers, both reserves and
ination increase seigniorage revenue and it is welfare maximizing to set a positive
reserve ratio and money growth that results in positive ination.
Another reason for governments to impose reserves is to insure deposits in the
case of bank failures. Since bank failures are more likely in less nancially developed
countries, the reserve ratio is higher in these countries. Both explanations for the
existence of reserves are consistent with the empirical evidence that reserves are higher
in countries with less developed nancial markets. My model, however, explains the
determination of the reserve ratio using the Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and
Brock (1989) channel because it can be more easily incorporated in the model and
can explain the joint determination of money growth and the reserve ratio.
The government policy instruments are, thus, the growth rate of money supply and
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the reserve ratio as in Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995). These policy instruments
are chosen so that the government maximizes the steady-state discounted utility of
households subject to the government budget constraint (29).
The discounted utility function of households in steady state, derived in the Ap-
pendix is:
 =
 ln &
(1 )2 +
ln(*)
1  
2
2(1 )  (32)
where bars correspond to steady-state levels of variables that are not constant in
steady state. Variables without time subscripts denote constant steady state levels.
Therefore the rst-order conditions of the government are:
+*+)
+( 
 )*+)
=
+*+
+( 
 )*+
=  (33)
where is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint and 
 is
real government revenue as a fraction of output. 
 equals the target seigniorage
revenue which is constant in steady-state and it is a parameter in the model as in
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
The rst-order conditions show that the government chooses the reserve ratio and
the growth rate of money supply so that the marginal eect of each policy tool on
utility is equal. These conditions and the government budget constraint determine
the optimal values for money growth and the reserve ratio, given the parameters of the
model. Once the optimal money growth is selected by the government, the optimal
ination rate can be obtained as well. Using the reserve requirement equation, we
see that the growth rate of reserves equals the ination rate plus the growth rate
of deposits. In steady-state the growth rate of deposits equals the growth rate of
the economy & Since there is equilibrium in the money market, the growth rate of
20
reserves equals the growth rate of money supply. Therefore, the ination rate under
the exible exchange rate regime equals the growth rate of money supply minus the
growth rate of the economy. Thus, high money growth results in high ination.
The novel feature of my analysis is that I also consider how the choice of money
growth and the reserve ratio changes with nancial development. I assume that,
when the level of nancial development changes, the government sets the values of
the policy instruments that will result in a government revenue as a fraction of output
equal to the target revenuewhich is the same as under the original level of nancial
development. This implies that the government wants to keep the same revenue per
output for any level of nancial development.9 In this way, the government policy
problem can explain why more nancially developed countries have lower ination and
reserve ratios. The intuition is the following: When nancial development increases
in the model, productivity growth increases as well because the repayment amount
innovators have to pay falls and entry increases. As a result of higher productivity
growth, the seigniorage revenue that the government can receive for given values of
the reserve ratio and money growth is higher. Thus, in order to receive the same
seigniorage revenue when nancial development is higher as under the original level
of nancial development, the government needs to reduce the reserve ratio and money
growth. This implies that both the reserve ratio and ination are lower when nancial
development increases.
Fixed exchange rate regime Under a xed exchange rate regime, purchasing
power parity requires that home ination equals foreign ination. The government
sets money supply so that this relationship holds. In this case, the government cannot
control ination to achieve a given level of government revenue. I assume that the
9If this assumption is relaxed and seigniorage revenue decreases with higher nancial development,
as in the data, the results of the paper are stronger.
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reserve ratio is also not a policy instrument but is kept the same as under the exible
exchange rate regime.1011
If we compare the ination rate under the two exchange rate regimes, we can
see that ination under the exible regime will be higher than ination under the
xed regime when domestic money growth under the exible exchange rate regime
minus productivity growth is greater than foreign ination. Therefore, the countries
with high money growth rates under the exible exchange rate regime will have lower
ination when they adopt a xed exchange rate regime.
1.3.5 Model Steady State
In steady state, exogenous productivity  is constant and equal to 1. Since the
expected discounted prots equal the innovation cost, there is positive entry in steady
state. Given that the probability of innovation is non-zero in steady state, the number
of rms in the economy, consumption, output, the number of entrants, deposits and
the real wage grow at a constant rate &. Also, the terms of trade are normalized to 1
in steady state, i.e.,  = . Therefore  = 1 and  = (1*) Also
 =  due to balanced trade. Here bars denote steady-state values of variables
that are not constant in steady state while variables without time subscripts denote
constant steady state levels.
The Euler equation for deposits shows that the gross real interest rate on deposits
is:
(1 + ') =
&

 (34)
10There is no evidence that reserves increase after a country moves from a exible to a xed
exchange rate regime. If the reserves decrease after the regime switch, then the growth dierence
between the regimes would be even higher, supporting the results in the paper.
11In this case the Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Brock (1989) mechanism is not applicable
because the home ination rate is tied to the foreign ination rate.
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The steady state number of entrants is such that:


=
&  1
(
)
 (35)
I denote 	

	
with ,, and 
 with - and write all equations in terms of these two
variables and the parameters of the model. From (35)
& = 1 + (-), (36)
i. e. the growth rate of the economy & increases with the probability of innovation
and entry of new entrepreneurs.
The labor market equilibrium equation, the repayment amount equation and the
resource constraint shown in the Appendix, together with the government choice of
money growth and the reserve ratio, determine the steady state of the model. They
show that - and , depend on home ination, and since & = 1+(-), the growth rate
& depends on home ination as well. I already showed that the dierent exchange
rate regimes result in dierent ination rates, so to evaluate the eect of exchange
rate regimes on growth I have to nd the eect of ination on growth. The above
equations cannot be solved analytically and, therefore, I evaluate these eects by
calibrating the model and calculating results numerically.
1.3.6 Calibration
In this section I calibrate the parameters in the model. The parameters are the fol-
lowing: the discount factor  the intermediate good share in nal output production
is  units of the nal good used for production of one variety of intermediate goods
, the monitoring cost $, the value of government revenue as a fraction of output,
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the elasticity of new intermediate goods with respect to innovation expenses, and the
weight of the disutility of labor in the period utility function.
In the baseline calibration I interpret periods as years and set the discount factor
 = 095. The intermediate good share in nal output production is  = 05 The
entrepreneurs produce one variety of intermediate goods using  = 1 units of the
nal home good.12 The steady-state level of labor eort is 1. I calibrate the model
to match characteristics of a cross-section of countries that had a exible exchange
rate regime and low level of nancial development (private credit/GDP22%). These
countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Peru, and Sri Lanka. The gross
steady-state productivity growth, &, obtained from the data for the period 1960-1995
is 1008038 and the steady-state ination rate, , is 03053.13 The steady-state
value of the probability of innovation, , equals 01269 and is obtained by matching
the growth rate of GDP per worker &  1 for the cross-section of countries for the
period 1960-1995 and the steady-state ratio of entering rms to incumbent rms which
equals 6.33 percent (World Bank Entrepreneurship Database 2009).14 I calibrate
the monitoring cost, $ to equal the overhead ratio of banks, which is the ratio of
bank overhead costs to total assets. It is 0.0656 in the data (Financial Structure
Database).15 I follow Haslag (1998) in calibrating the reserve requirement ratio. It is
calculated as the ratio of reserves to the sum of demand, time, and saving deposits
using the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database. The value I obtain is
 = 0282 The above calibrated values are used to calculate the value of government
revenue as a fraction of output, the elasticity of new intermediate goods with respect
12The value of  does not change the results, so I normalize it to 1.
13Productivity growth is calculated as the growth of GDP per worker as in Aghion et al. (2009).
14I calibrate the steady-state probability of innovation () to match the


ratio in the
data according to () =
(1)


15I follow Bose and Murshid (2008) and calibrate the monitoring cost as bank overhead costs.
Also, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) use this as a measure of the cost of nancial intermediation.
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to innovation expenses, and the weight of the disutility of labor in the period utility
function.
Also, as a robustness check, I include Argentina in the cross-section of countries
used to calibrate the parameter values. During 1960-1995 period Argentina had a low
level of nancial development and predominantly exible exchange rate regime that
was associated with very high steady-state ination and I would like to nd how the
high steady-state ination aects the results in this paper. The calibrated values in
this case are:  = 095  = 1 & = 1008671  = 04424 steady-state probability of
innovation  is 0135,  = 0296 $ = 00659
The calibrated values of ination, productivity growth, the reserve ratio, and the
probability of innovation are only used to calculate the parameters of the model. In
the next section, I use the model to obtain the optimal values of money growth and
the reserve ratio. Then I calculate productivity growth, ination, and the probability
of innovation based on the model.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Eect of Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth
In this section I numerically evaluate the growth eects of a xed versus a exible
exchange rate regime for dierent levels of nancial development. Consistent with
the monetary policy described above, under the exible exchange rate, money growth
and reserves are endogenously determined by the government. I calculate what these
values are using the parameters of the model and, in addition, calculate the resulting
productivity growth and ination, based on the model. I repeat this calculation for
dierent values of the parameter $, which is the monitoring cost used as a proxy for
nancial development.
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Under the xed exchange rate regime, ination is exogenous and equals the ina-
tion rate of the foreign country. I set this value to match the average ination rate
for xed exchange rate countries found in the data, which is 7 percent (Ghosh et
al. 1996). The reserve ratio under a xed regime is the same as the optimal reserve
ratio obtained for a country with exible exchange rate regime and the same nancial
development, $. Given the ination and reserve ratio, next I calculate productivity
growth for dierent values of $. Finally, I compare the results obtained based on the
two exchange rate regimes, as shown in Table 1.
For both calibrations the results show that, when the country has a exible ex-
change rate regime, the optimal ination rate and reserve ratio increase when nancial
development is reduced, and, as a result, productivity growth decreases. Comparing
with the xed exchange rate regime, we see that the growth dierences between the
two exchange rate regimes increase when nancial development is reduced. The intu-
ition for these results is as follows: Since growth increases with nancial development,
the seigniorage revenue that the government can receive for given values of reserves
and ination is higher when nancial development is higher. Thus, in order to receive
the same seigniorage revenue when nancial development is lower, the government
needs to increase reserves and ination. As a result, the dierence between the ina-
tion rate under the xed and exible exchange rate regimes increases when nancial
development is reduced. As shown previously, higher ination increases the wedge
between the return on deposits and loans, so that the repayment amount that entre-
preneurs have to pay for borrowing is higher. Thus, entry of innovators is reduced
until rm value and the repayment amount become equal, which results in lower
growth. The additional increase of reserves when nancial development is low further
reduces growth, so that the growth dierences between a xed and a exible exchange
rate regime are larger when nancial development is lower.
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Numerically, the eect of exchange rate regimes on growth is dierent for the
two calibration exercises. More specically, for the rst calibration, given the exible
exchange rate regime the optimal reserve ratio is 0.258 and the optimal gross ination
rate is 1.3502, corresponding to gross productivity growth 1.00819. Under the xed
exchange rate regime, ination is 1.07 and the reserve ratio is 0.258 with productivity
growth 1.0107. As a result, a move from the exible to the xed exchange rate regime
increases growth by 0.251 percentage points. If, in addition, the monitoring cost, $,
increases by 1 percentage point, which corresponds to a lower nancial development
(approximately 7% decrease in private credit/GDP), the optimal reserve ratio in the
exible exchange rate regime is 0.2904 and optimal ination is 1.3560, so that the
growth dierence between the regimes would be 0.296 percentage points. When the
monitoring cost decreases by 1 percentage point, corresponding to higher nancial
development, this result would be 0.237 percentage points. For the second calibration,
a move from the exible to a xed exchange rate regime would increase growth by
0.356 percentage points. When the monitoring cost decreases by 1 percentage point,
this result would be 0.331 percentage points. These results show that for the second
calibration, where steady-state ination is higher, the growth dierences are larger.
For this calibration, however, the seigniorage revenue that the government receives
is larger. If the seigniorage revenue is kept the same for both calibrations, then the
growth dierence for the second calibration becomes smaller than the one based on
the rst calibration. This means that the value of seigniorage revenue is important
for the numerical results in the paper. In the next section, I explore how the results
change when I vary the value of seigniorage revenue.
The results that I obtain have strong empirical support. They are qualitatively
consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Aghion et al. (2009). In addition,
they are consistent with many empirical studies that estimate the eect of ination
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on growth and nd that ination reduces growth. Among these are Fischer (1991),
Fischer (1993), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Grier and Tullock (1989), and
Barro (1995). Furthermore, Haslag and Koo (1999) and the evidence I presented
in Section 2 show that reserves increase when nancial development is lower and
that reserves and ination move together. Quantitatively, the eects I nd in this
paper are slightly smaller that the empirical results in Aghion et al. (2009). They
nd that for a country with 27% private credit/GDP, which is in the middle of the
second quartile of nancial development, the growth dierence between a xed and
a exible exchange rate regime would be 0.43%. The countries in my paper have an
average private credit/GDP of 16%, corresponding to the upper of the rst quartile of
nancial development, i.e., they have a lower nancial development than the country
in Aghion et al. (2009), and the growth dierences I obtain are 0.249% and 0.353% for
the rst and second calibration respectively. In addition, Aghion et al. (2009) show
that the growth dierence are insignicant in well developed countries, while in my
model the growth dierence between the regimes decrease with nancial development
at a smaller rate than in Aghion et al. (2009). In the next section I show that it
is possible to obtain results closer to the ones in Aghion et al. (2009) if I take into
account that seigniorage revenues are smaller in well nancially developed countries.
Sensitivity Analysis Here, I consider how the above results change when I vary
the initially calibrated values of the probability of successful innovation and the target
government revenue. These values aect the determination of the elasticity of new
intermediate goods with respect to innovation expenses, and the weight of the disu-
tility of labor in the period utility function. Therefore, they aect the values of the
endogenous variables implied by the model and, thus, it is necessary to explore what
happens when the values of the probability of innovation and government revenue
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change. The sensitivity analysis focuses on the rst calibration shown above.
First, I vary the value of the probability of innovation. The values used are 0.08
and 0.20. When the probability of innovation is 0.08, the results are the following:
Given the initial value of $, growth increases by 0.251 percentage points when a
country moves from a exible to a xed exchange rate regime. The growth dierence
becomes 0.236 percentage points when$ is reduced by 0.01. When the probability of
innovation is 0.20, given the initial value of $, growth increases by 0.252 percentage
points when a country moves from a exible to a xed exchange rate regime. The
growth dierence becomes 0.239 percentage points when $ is reduced by 0.01. These
results are very similar to the results obtained previously and show that the initial
value of the probability of innovation does not aect the results much.
Next, I vary the target value of the seigniorage revenue The value used in the
initial calibration is 0.00266. Here I also use 0.0015 and 0.0030. When the target
seigniorage revenue is 0.0015, for the initial value of $, growth increases by 0.093
percentage points when a country moves from a exible to a xed exchange rate
regime. When $ decreases by 0.01, the growth dierence is 0.090 percentage points.
If the target seigniorage revenue is 0.0030, then the growth dierences are larger for
any level of nancial development. For the initial value of $, growth increases by
0.39 percentage points when a country moves from a exible to a xed exchange
rate regime. When $ decreases by 0.01, the growth dierence is 0.33 percentage
points. Therefore, the target value of seigniorage revenue has an important role for
the results in the paper. When the target value of seigniorage revenue is higher, the
growth dierences between the exchange rate regimes are larger and fall more when
nancial development is increased. The opposite happens for low values of seigniorage
revenue. So far in this paper I have assumed that seigniorage revenue is the same
for any level of nancial development. There is evidence in the data that seigniorage
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revenue is higher in less nancially developed countries. 16 If this is incorporated
in the model, so that seigniorage revenue decreases with nancial development, the
results just presented imply that the growth dierences between the exchange rate
regimes will be much lower in nancially developed countries, making the results in
the paper closer to the empirical results in Aghion et al. (2009).
1.4.2 Welfare
I calculate the steady-state welfare cost of moving from a exible exchange rate regime
with ination determined by the model to a xed exchange rate regime with ination
equal to 7%. Welfare is measured as the percentage change in consumption that would
make the consumer as well o in the baseline policy setting as in the new policy setting
where ination is lower. Let 0 be the steady state expected lifetime utility in the
baseline policy setting where bars denote steady-state values of variables that are not
constant in steady state. Variables without time subscripts denote constant steady
state levels:
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Also 1 is the steady state expected lifetime utility in the new policy setting:
1
"μ


¶1
 &11
#
=
X
=0

"
ln
μ


¶1
+  ln &1  
2
¡
1
¢2#
 (38)
The welfare measure . is then dened so that
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16See Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992)
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I assume that the initial number of entrepreneurs in the economy is 0 = 1
Using the rst calibration shown above, I obtain the following welfare results: For
the initial value of the monitoring cost, $, a reduction of ination from 3502% to
7% will correspond to a move from exible to xed exchange rate regime which will
increase welfare by 2.3%. This welfare eect would have been reduced to 2.1% if the
monitoring cost, $, were reduced by 0.01, i.e., if nancial development increased.
If the monitoring cost, $, were increased by 0.01, corresponding to a reduction in
nancial development, the welfare gain would have been 2.9%. Using the second
calibration, given the initial value of $, a reduction of ination from 48.76% to 7%
will correspond to a move from exible to xed exchange rate regime leading to
an increase in welfare of 2.4%. This welfare eect would be reduced to 2% if the
monitoring cost were reduced by 0.01. Therefore, the results show that the move
from a exible to a xed exchange rate regime increases welfare, and more so when
the level of nancial development is lower.
These results also show that the welfare eect of ination is negative. This is
qualitatively consistent with previous results in the literature, which nd that higher
steady-state ination reduces welfare (Haslag 1998 and Gomme 1993).17 In addition
the current model allows for evaluating the steady-state welfare eect of ination for
dierent levels of nancial development and shows that the welfare eect is larger
when nancial development is lower.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper presents one channel that can explain why a exible exchange rate regime
leads to signicantly lower long-run productivity growth than a xed exchange rate
17See Haslag (1998) and Gomme (1993) for more details.
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regime in countries with low level of nancial development, while the eect in nan-
cially developed counties is much smaller, as documented by Aghion et al. (2009). I
have built a general equilibrium model that shows that xed and exible exchange
rate regimes aect growth dierently because they result in dierent steady-state in-
ation rates. More specically, in my model I show that less nancially developed
countries have higher ination when there is a exible exchange rate regime in the
country. In addition, the nancial intermediaries in these countries hold a larger
fraction of deposits as required reserves. Both reserves and ination in the model
decrease productivity growth and, as a result, less nancially developed countries,
which hold more reserves and have higher ination, have low productivity growth.
When these countries switch to a xed exchange rate regime, their ination rate is
signicantly reduced, and, as a result, growth increases. The model also predicts that,
compared to less nancially developed countries, nancially developed countries have
lower ination and reserves given a exible exchange rate regime, so that, even if they
move to a xed exchange rate regime, the growth dierence between the exchange
rate regimes will be much smaller. Therefore, less nancially developed countries
benet more from having a xed exchange rate regime. Quantitatively, the eects
I nd in the paper are smaller than the empirical results in Aghion et al. (2009).
For nancially developed countries, the growth dierences between the regimes are
smaller than the ones obtained for less nancially developed countries but they are
still larger than the values obtained in Aghion et al. (2009). I also show that it is
possible to obtain results closer to the ones in Aghion et al. (2009) if I take into
account that seigniorage revenues are smaller in nancially developed countries.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Derivation of eq. (32)
I show the derivation of the steady-state expected discounted lifetime utility of house-
holds (32).
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where bars denote steady-state values of variables that are not constant in steady
state. Variables without time subscripts denote constant steady state levels.
1.6.2 Steady-state results
Here I show the solution for the steady state of the model. I drop the time subscripts
of variables constant in steady state. Again bars denote steady-state levels of variables
that are not constant in steady state.
The labor market equilibrium in the steady state is:
-,+ 1+()
[1+()]0()
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i.e., the sum of labor used in production and research equals total labor supply.
The repayment amount equation is:
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The resource constraint is:
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From the expression for   I obtain the ratio of period prots and expected dis-
counted lifetime prots for entrepreneurs:

 
=
&  

 (43)
where the time subscript is omitted because  and  are constant in steady state.
Therefore,

 
=
&  

 (44)
Since   represents the amount of capital in the economy, this results shows that
the share of prots in total capital is constant, consistent with Kaldor (1957). I nd
that the expected discounted prots  equal:
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Period prots of entrepreneurs are:
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Labor used for production of intermediate goods is:
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Since  = 
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The prots equation gives the ratio of total period prots to nal good output:


=  (1 )  (49)
Combining this with ( 35) yields the share of investment to output:
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From the resource constraint I obtain the ratio of consumption and output:
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Then, the ratio of total period prots to consumption is:
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the ratio of total lifetime prots to consumption is:
 
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=

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and the share of investment in consumption is:
 
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=
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The amount of loans each entering entrepreneur borrows from the nancial interme-
diary is:
"
 = -(1 )
³ 
2
´ 
1
 (55)
The ratio of consumption to the number of entrepreneurs is:


=


³ 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´
 (56)
Given the calibration above, I obtain the numerical values for all the variables that
describe the steady-state.
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1.6.3 List of Countries
Algeria El Salvador Kenya Portugal
Argentina Finland Korea Rwanda
Australia France Lesotho Senegal
Austria Gambia, The Malawi Sierra Leone
Belgium Germany Malaysia South Africa
Bolivia Ghana Malta Spain
Brazil Greece Mauritius Sri Lanka
Cameroon Guatemala Mexico Sudan
Canada Guyana Netherlands Sweden
Central African Rep. Haiti New Zealand Switzerland
Chile Honduras Nicaragua Syrian Arab Republic
Colombia India Niger Thailand
Congo, Republic of Indonesia Norway Togo
Costa Rica Iran Pakistan Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus Ireland Panama United States
Denmark Israel Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Dominican Republic Italy Paraguay Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Ecuador Jamaica Peru
Egypt Japan Philippines
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Figure 1: Evidence of negative relationship between nancial development (private
credit/GDP) and reserve ratio
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Figure 2: Relationship between private credit/GDP and bank overhead ratio
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Figure 3: Evidence of positive relationship between bank overhead ratio and reserve
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Figure 4: Evidence of positive relationship between ination and reserve ratios
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Chapter 2
Financial Development, Exchange Rate
Regimes, and Productivity Growth:
An Empirical Investigation
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2.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the empirical relationship between nancial development, ex-
change rate regimes and productivity growth. Its main goal is to test if the theo-
retical model developed in Slavtcheva (2010) can explain why xed exchange rate
regimes result in higher long-run productivity growth in countries with low level of
nancial development but not in well nancially developed countries. The hypothesis
of the theoretical model is the following: a xed exchange rate regime leads to lower
ination and, consequently, higher growth in countries where ination under the ex-
ible regime is high and where nancial intermediaries hold a fraction of deposits as
reserves. The positive eect of xed exchange rate regimes on growth is larger for
countries with lower levels of nancial development because ination and the fraction
of deposits held as reserves are higher in these countries.
Thus, I would like to test if the high reserve ratio and high ination in less -
nancially developed countries with exible exchange rate regimes can explain why
long-run growth is higher under xed exchange rate regimes.
In order to test this hypothesis, I apply a panel data technique that uses the
GMM panel estimator introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1997). The advantage of using the GMM panel estimator is that it overcomes
many of the limitations of cross-sectional analysis, namely it takes into account the
time-series variation of the data, controls for country-specic eects, simultaneity,
and endogeneity of all explanatory variables in the regression.
The data includes 83 countries during the period 1960-2000. To eliminate business-
cycle eects and focus on long-term relationships, I use 5-year averages of the data.
The dependent variable in this analysis is output per worker, while the regressors
include a number of growth controls that are common in the literature, as well as
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a variable describing the exchange rate regime, nancial development, the ination
rate, and reserve ratios. The exchange rate regime is determined according to the
Reinhart and Rogo classication and nancial development is measured as Private
credit/GDP.
My baseline regression shows that a xed exchange rate regime leads to higher
long-run productivity growth in less nancially developed countries. This is the same
result as in Aghion et al. (2009), who provide the initial empirical evidence that
exchange rate regimes aect long-run productivity growth. The dependent variable in
the baseline regression is productivity growth (the growth rate of output per worker),
while the explanatory variables are nancial development, the exchange rate regime,
the interaction of nancial development and the exchange rate regime, initial value
of output per worker, the rate of secondary school enrollment, the ination rate,
government spending/GDP, trade openness and time dummies.
The results show that when the interaction eect of ination and nancial devel-
opment is included in the baseline regression, the interaction eect of the exchange
rate regime and nancial development is no longer signicant. This means that the
ination dierential in countries caused by the exchange rate regime dierences can
explain why a xed regime leads to higher growth in less nancially developed coun-
tries.
Because reserves are the reason why ination has higher impact on growth in less
nancially developed countries, I replace the interaction eect of ination and nan-
cial development with the interaction of the reserve ratio and nancial development.
The results show that again when the interaction of the reserve ratio and nancial
development is included, the interaction eect of exchange rates and nancial de-
velopment is no longer signicant, supporting the idea of the theoretical model in
Slavtcheva (2010).
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This paper is closest to Aghion et al. (2009), who also applies the same panel-data
technique but do not control for the cross-country dierences in reserve ratios and do
not consider that the eect of ination could vary depending on the level of nancial
development (i.e. they do not include the interaction eect of ination and nancial
development).
Other papers that analyze the relationship between exchange rate regimes and
growth are Baxter and Stockman (1989), Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003), Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Razin and Rubinstein(2006), Husain, Mody and
Rogo (2005), De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005), and Dubas et al. (2005). Most of
these studies do not nd a signicant empirical relationship between exchange rate
regimes and growth but Dubas et al. (2005) nd that low income countries have
higher growth under xed exchange rates. Beck et al. (2000) is the rst to apply the
GMM system estimator to analyze the eect of nancial development on growth but
do not include exchange rates in their analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3
describes the methodology used in this paper. Section 4 presents the results. Section
5 concludes.
2.2 Data
In this section I describe the measures of nancial development, exchange rate regimes,
productivity growth, as well as the other explanatory variables used in this analysis.
I collect data on nancial development, exchange rate regimes, productivity growth,
ination, reserve ratios, government spending/GDP, trade openness and secondary
education for 83 countries for the period 1960-2000. The list of countries is included
in the Appendix. All variables are transformed into 5-year averages to eliminate
business-cycle eects and focus on long-term relationships as in Beck et al. (2000)
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and Aghion et al. (2009).
Financial development is dened as Private credit/ GDP, where private credit
shows the amount of credit provided by nancial intermediaries to the private sector.
All nancial intermediaries oering credit to the private sector, except for central
banks and development banks, are included in the calculation of private credit. The
same measure of nancial development is used in Beck et al. (2000) and Aghion et al.
(2009). The advantage of private credit/GDP is that it shows the ability of nancial
intermediaries to identify and allocate resources to protable projects. Even though
a perfect measure of nancial development is not available, private credit/GDP is
considered a better measure of nancial intermediary development than measures
used in previous studies, such as claims on private sector/GDP (see Beck et al. 2000
for more details).
Private credit is measured at the end of the period, while GDP is measured over
the period. To account for this measurement dierence of the two data series, I deate
private credit by end-of-year consumer price index (CPI) and I deate GDP by the
annual CPI. The private credit/GDP index is then calculated as the average of the
deated private credit in periods t and t-1 divided by the deated GDP in period t.
Productivity growth in this paper is measured as output per worker following
Aghion el al. (2009).
I use the exchange rate classication of Reinhart and Rogo to determine the
exchange rate regime of the countries included in the sample. This classication is
based on the de facto exchange rate regime observed in a country. The exchange
rate variable used in the regression is a ve-year average of the Reinhart and Rogo
index. The Reinhart and Rogo index classies regimes from the most rigid to the
most exible into ve categories, denoted 1 through 5. Category 1 corresponds to
x, category 2 is peg, category 3 is managed oat, category 4 denotes oat, while
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5 corresponds to a "free falling" category that is omitted from the analysis. Only
countries with a non free-falling regime for at least 3 out of 5 years are included in
the regression samples. Aghion el al. (2009) show that the original results are not
sensitive to this specic exchange rate measure. They are able to obtain the same
results also using the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) exchange rate classication
(see Aghion et al. 2009 for more details).
I follow Haslag (1998) in measuring the reserve requirement ratio as the ratio
of bank reserves over the sum of demand and saving deposits in the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset.
The ination rate is the average annual CPI data from IFS. Government spending
is real government consumption divided by real GDP. Trade openness is dened as the
sum of real exports and real imports of goods and nonnancial services as a share of
real GDP. Education is the ratio of total secondary school enrollment. More detailed
denitions and sources for the data are available in the Appendix.
2.3 Methodology
I apply a panel data technique that uses the GMM panel estimator introduced
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997). This estimator is
well suited to analyze data with large cross-sectional dimension and small time-series
number of observation, as is the case in this analysis. The data I use includes 83
countries and 8 time periods (because I use 5 year-averages of the data), i.e. the
cross-sectional size is much larger than the time dimension.
The advantage of using the GMM panel estimator is that it overcomes many of
the limitations of cross-sectional analysis, namely it takes into account the time-series
variation of the data, controls for unobserved country-specic eects, simultaneity,
and endogeniety of all explanatory variables in the regression. The data show that
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there is a substantial cross-country variation of the variables that the GMM panel
estimator can control for. Furthermore, there is signicant within-country variation
of private credit and productivity growth that can improve the results when we use
the GMM panel estimator. Controlling for simultaneity in the current analysis is
particularly important because nancial development and growth can simultaneously
aect each other as shown by a large body of literature. Also, it is crucial to control for
the endogeneity of all explanatory variables in order to obtain unbiased parameter
estimates. Cross-sectional studies have been able to nd an exogenous instrument
for nancial development, the country of legal origin, but they do not control for
the endogeneity of the rest of the explanatory variables. The GMM panel approach
overcomes the lack of external instruments by using internal instruments which are
lags of the explanatory variables in the analysis.
The general form of the panel regression equation is the following:
  = 
0/1 1 + 
0/2  + ) + 0 +  
where y is the dependent variable, i.e. productivity growth, /1 1 represents the
set of lagged explanatory variables, /2  is the set of contemporaneous explanatory
variables, ) is an unobserved country-specic xed eect, 0 is a time-specic eect,
  is the error term and i represents the country and t represents a 5-year time period.
The GMMpanel estimator uses a rst-dierences regression to remove the country-
specic xed eect:
    1 = 0
¡
/1 1 /1 2
¢
+ 0
¡
/2  /2 1
¢
+ (    1) 
By doing so, however, it introduces correlation between the resulting error term,
    1 and the lagged dependent variable  1   2 , which is part of the
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lagged explanatory variable /1 1  /1 2. For that reason, I use lagged values of
the explanatory variables in levels as instruments.
In order to keep the cross-country dimension of the data and to minimize mea-
surement error biases (Griliches and Hausman, 1986), the rst-dierences regression
is supplemented by the original equation in levels to form the GMM system estimator.
Again, instruments are used to control for country-specic eects. The instruments
for the levels equations are the lagged dierences of the explanatory variables. Only
the most recent lagged dierences are used as instruments to avoid redundant moment
conditions.
The GMM system estimator is a two-step estimator that allows for heteroskedas-
ticity of the errors. The rst step assumes independent and homoskedastic errors
 while the second step uses the residuals from the rst step to obtain consistent
estimates of the variance-covariance matrix and no longer requires independence and
homoskedasticity.
In small samples the two-step estimator produces less accurate approximation
of the asymptotic distribution of parameters (see Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer,
2000). To account for this, I use the Windmeijer (2000) nite-sample correction for
the asymptotic variance of the GMM estimators.
The GMM system estimator can be applied under the assumption of weak ex-
ogeneity, i.e. the explanatory variables can be aected by past and current values
of the dependent variable but cannot be correlated with future values of the error
term. Another assumption is that there is no second-order serial correlation of the
error term. Furthermore, the correlation of the country-specic eect and the levels
of the explanatory variables should be constant over time so that the lagged dier-
ences of the explanatory variables can be valid instruments in the levels equation.
If these assumptions are satised, the GMM system estimator is consistent. I test
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these assumptions by applying the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and
the test for no second order serial correlation. When it is not possible to reject the
null hypotheses of these tests, the assumptions of the GMM estimator are satised
and the regression model is valid.
2.4 Results
This section presents the results of the GMM system panel regression of productivity
growth on nancial development, the exchange rate regime, the interaction of nancial
development and the exchange rate regime and a set of conditioning explanatory
variables that aect growth and are commonly used in the empirical growth literature
(Barro, 1991; Easterly et al., 1997). The role of these additional conditioning variables
is to allow us to extract the independent eect of the exchange rate regime on growth.
I start the empirical analysis by rst replicating the results of Aghion et al. (2009)
and later add additional variables to test the hypothesis that high reserve ratios and
high ination in countries with exible exchange rate regimes explain the results
presented by Aghion et al. (2009).
The rst regression in Table 3 aims at replicating the original result by Aghion
et al. (2009) that a xed exchange rate regime leads to higher long-run productivity
growth in less nancially developed countries. It uses the same methodology, ex-
planatory and dependent variables as in Aghion et al. (2009), namely it applies the
GMM system estimator, where the dependent variable is productivity growth (the
growth rate of output per worker), while the explanatory variables are nancial devel-
opment, the exchange rate regime, the interaction of nancial development and the
exchange rate regime, initial value of output per worker, the rate of secondary school
enrollment, the ination rate, government spending/GDP, trade openness and time
dummies. The initial value of output per worker controls for convergence of countries,
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the average years of schooling controls for the human capital in the country; the in-
ation rate and government spending/GDP account for macroeconomic stability and
trade openness measures the degree of openness of the country.
I use the rst lags of the initial output per worker and the rate of secondary
school enrollment as instruments in the rst dierences equation. I also use the
second lags of private credit, the exchange rate variable, the interaction of private
credit and the exchange rate variable, the ination rate, government spending/GDP
and trade openness as instruments in the rst dierences equation. The instruments
for the levels equation are the dierences of the initial output per worker and the
rate of secondary school enrollment, as well as the lagged dierences of private credit,
the exchange rate variable, the interaction of private credit and the exchange rate
variable, the ination rate, government spending/GDP and trade openness.
The regression output tables report the coecients and p-values below them in
parenthesis. The results in Table 3 show that there is a signicant at the 5% level
positive interaction eect of nancial development and the exchange rate regime on
growth and a signicant negative main eect of the exchange rate regime on produc-
tivity growth. This means that as the exchange rate regime becomes less exible and
the nancial development is reduced, productivity growth increases. Also there is a
cuto of the level of nancial development at which the interaction eect of the ex-
change rate regime and nancial development and the main eect of the exchange rate
regime are completely oset and the exchange rate regime has no eect on growth.
This cuto value equals 0.8, thus it corresponds to the nancial development of a
well nancially developed country such as Austria. Most of the other explanatory
variables have the expected sign but only secondary education and the time dum-
mies are statistically signicant in this analysis. It is surprising that the coecient
on the initial value of output per worker is not signicant but the same result can
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be observed in Aghion et al. (2009). The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are appropriate.
The test for second-order serial correlation shows that there is no second-order serial
correlation, conrming that the results of the GMM system estimator are valid.
Given the baseline regression in Table 3, I extend the analysis to test the hypoth-
esis that high reserve ratios and high ination in countries with exible exchange rate
regimes explain the results in Table 3. In Table 4, I present a regression that includes
all variables shown in Table 3 but also add the interaction eect of ination and -
nancial development. This reects the idea that ination in less nancially developed
countries has larger eect on growth based on the theoretical model in Slavtcheva
(2010). The instruments used in this regression are the same as those used in the rst
regression with the addition of the interaction of ination and private credit. The
results in Table 4 shows that when the interaction eect of ination and nancial de-
velopment is included in the baseline regression, the interaction eect of the exchange
rate regime and nancial development is no longer signicant. This means that the
ination dierential in countries caused by the exchange rate dierences can explain
why a xed regime leads to higher growth in less nancially developed countries.
I extend this analysis further in Table 5. Because reserves are the reason why
ination has higher impact on growth in less nancially developed countries, I replace
the interaction eect of ination and nancial development with the interaction of
the reserve ratio and nancial development. The results in Table 5 show that again
when the interaction of the reserve ratio and nancial development is included, the
interaction eect of exchange rates and nancial development is no longer signicant,
supporting the idea of the theoretical model in Slavtcheva (2010).
Furthermore, I provide evidence that ination and reserve ratios have negative
eect on growth and that this eect is larger in countries with low level of nan-
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cial development. Table 6 shows the output of a regression where the dependent
variable is productivity growth and the explanatory variables are initial output per
worker, education, government spending, trade openness, ination, and the interac-
tion of ination and nancial development. I nd that there is a negative statistically
signicant main eect of ination on growth and a positive signicant interaction
eect of ination and nancial development18. This means that ination has a neg-
ative impact on growth but the eect diminishes as nancial development increases,
consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model in Slavtcheva (2010).
Similarly in Table 7 I nd that there is a negative statistically signicant main
eect of the reserve ratio on growth and a positive signicant interaction eect of
the reserve ratio and nancial development19. This shows that the reserve ratio
has a negative impact on growth but the eect diminishes as nancial development
increases, again consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model in Slavtcheva
(2010).
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examines empirically the hypothesis of the theoretical model developed
in Slavtcheva (2010). Namely, it tests if high reserve ratios and high ination in less
nancially developed countries with exible exchange rate regimes contribute to the
higher long-run growth under xed exchange rate regimes. Also, it shows that reserve
ratios and ination have a negative eect on growth which diminishes with nancial
development. This is accomplished by applying a GMM panel data technique in-
18When private credit is added to the regression in Table 6, the interaction of ination and private
credit becomes insignicant.
19If ination is included in the regression in Table 7, reserves and the interaction of reserves and
ination are no longer signicant. Also, if private credit is included in the same regression, the
coecient on the reserve ratio is not signicant and switches its sign. These results might be due to
high correlation between ination and the reserve ratio, and between the reserve ratio and private
credit.
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troduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997). The data
includes 83 countries during the period 1960-2000. The dependent variable in this
analysis is productivity growth, while the regressors include a number of growth con-
trols that are common in the literature, as well as a variable describing the exchange
rate regime, nancial development, the ination rate, and reserve ratios. The results
show that when the interaction eect of ination and nancial development or the
interaction of the reserve ratio and nancial development is included in the baseline
regression that nds a signicant interaction eect of exchange rate regimes and -
nancial development, the interaction eect of the exchange rate regime and nancial
development is no longer signicant, supporting the idea of the theoretical model in
Slavtcheva (2010).
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2.6 Appendix
Table 1: List of countries included in the sample
Algeria Egypt Kenya Sierra Leone
Argentina El Salvador Korea Singapore
Australia Finland Madagascar South Africa
Austria France Malawi Spain
Bangladesh Gambia, The Malaysia Sri Lanka
Belgium Germany Mexico Sweden
Bolivia Ghana Morocco Switzerland
Botswana Greece Netherlands Syrian Arab Republic
Brazil Guatemala New Zealand Thailand
Burkina Faso Haiti Nicaragua Togo
Canada Honduras Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Chile Iceland Nigeria Tunisia
China India Norway Turkey
Colombia Indonesia Pakistan Uganda
Congo, Dem. Rep. Iran Panama United Kingdom
Congo, Republic of Ireland Papua New Guinea United States
Costa Rica Israel Paraguay Uruguay
Cote d’Ivoire Italy Peru Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Denmark Jamaica Philippines Zambia
Dominican Republic Japan Portugal Zimbabwe
Ecuador Jordan Senegal
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Table 2: Denitions and Sources of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis
Variable Denition and Construction Source
Output per worker Real GDP per worker. Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)
Output per worker growth Log dierence of real output Author’ construction using
per worker. Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)
Initial Output per worker Initial value of Real GDP Chain Author’ construction using
per worker. Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)
Exchange rate exibility See Data Section Reinhart and Rogo (2004)
Education Ratio of total secondary enrollment, Global Development Network
regardless of age, to the population (2002) and The World Bank (2002)
of the age group that corresponds
to that level of education.
Private Credit Ratio of domestic credit claims Author’s calculations using data
on private sector to GDP from IFS and Heston, Summers
and Aten (2002). Calculations
based on Beck et al. (2000)
Trade Openness Ratio of exports and imports Author’s calculations with data
in 1995 US$ to GDP in 1995 US$ from The World Bank (2002)
Government Spending Ratio of government consumption The World Bank (2002).
to GDP.
Ination rate Annual % change in CPI Author’s calculations using data
(2000=100) at the end of the year. from IFS
Reserve Ratio Ratio of bank reserves to demand Author’s calculations using data
and saving deposits from IFS
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Table 3: Financial development, exchange rate regimes and productivity growth
Dependent Variable: Productivity Growth, p-values in parentheses
GMM two-step system estimator
Private Credit -0.995
(0.399)
Secondary Education 1.718
(0.000)
Initial Output -0.533
(0.358)
Government Spending -0.709
(0.356)
Ination 0.106
(0.909)
Trade Openness 1.261
(0.195)
Exchange Rate Flexibility -3.309
(0.028)
Exchange Rate Flexibility*Private Credit 0.755
(0.05)
Constant 3.643
(0.580)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.999
Second-Order Serial Correlation test (p-value) 0.516
Observations 422
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Table 4: The interaction of ination and nancial development
Dependent Variable: Productivity Growth, p-values in parentheses
GMM two-step system estimator
Private Credit 9.706
(0.547)
Secondary Education 1.885
(0.002)
Initial Output -0.647
(0.299)
Government Spending -0.933
(0.193)
Ination 5.169
(0.582)
Trade Openness 0.574
(0.468)
Exchange Rate Flexibility -2.614
(0.112)
Exchange Rate Flexibility*Private Credit 0.595
(0.184)
Ination*Private Credit -2.275
(0.522)
Constant -16.983
(0.704)
Sargan test (p-value) 1.000
Second-Order Serial Correlation test (p-value) 0.492
Observations 422
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Table 5: The interaction of reserves and nancial development
Dependent Variable: Productivity Growth, p-values in parentheses
GMM two-step system estimator
Private Credit -0.211
(0.885)
Secondary Education 1.715
(0.023)
Initial Growth -0.326
(0.601)
Government Spending -0.770
(0.235)
Ination -1.393
(0.447)
Trade Openness 1.358
(0.115)
Exchange Rate Flexibility -3.606
(0.072)
Exchange Rate Flexibility*Private Credit 0.840
(0.123)
Reserve Ratio 1.683
(0.139)
Reserve Ratio*Private Credit -0.422
(0.188)
Constant 5.099
(0.671)
Sargan test (p-value) 1.000
Second-Order Serial Correlation test (p-value) 0.467
Observations 410
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Table 6: The eect of ination on productivity growth
Dependent Variable: Productivity Growth, p-values in parentheses
GMM two-step system estimator
Secondary Education 1.015
(0.213)
Initial Growth -0.969
(0.241)
Government Spending -0.783
(0.382)
Trade Openness -0.487
(0.592)
Ination -2.891
(0.000)
Ination*Private Credit 0.277
(0.006)
Constant 22.255
(0.023)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.589
Second-Order Serial Correlation test (p-value) 0.825
Observations 479
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Table 7: The eect of reserve ratio on productivity growth
Dependent Variable: Productivity Growth, p-values in parentheses
GMM two-step system estimator
Secondary Education 0.944
(0.180)
Initial Growth -0.449
(0.593)
Government Spending -0.765
(0.478)
Trade Openness 0.168
(0.823)
Reserve Ratio -1.519
(0.014)
Reserve Ratio*Private Credit 0.342
(0.024)
Constant 7.056
(0.326)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.470
Second-Order Serial Correlation test (p-value) 0.839
Observations 478
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Chapter 3
Business Cycles, Exchange Rate
Regimes, and ProductivityGrowth
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3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the short-run eect of alternative exchange rate
regimes on the macroeconomic performance of a small open economy with endogenous
productivity growth and underdeveloped nancial markets. It also examines if there is
any trade-o between the short-run and long-run eect of xed and exible exchange
rate regimes on the economy. In addition, the paper analyzes how well the model
economy can explain stylized business cycle properties of developing countries.
This paper uses the model rst introduced in Slavtcheva (2010). This is a dynamic
general equilibrium model that includes endogenous productivity growth, which is a
result of increase in the number of varieties of home intermediate goods, and a nan-
cial intermediary sector faced with an asymmetric information problem in nancing
the innovation activities of domestic entrepreneurs. The contribution of the current
paper is that it considers how the choice of exchange rate regimes aects productivity
growth and other macroeconomic variables in response to two shocks to the econ-
omy: a shock to exogenous technology and a shock to the foreign interest rate. The
model analyzes the responses of the economy when both goods and nancial assets are
traded. Furthermore, the paper shows welfare analysis and compares model implied
second moments to moments observed in the data.
Following Slavtcheva (2010), the nancial intermediary holds reserves whose re-
turn depends on ination and as a result the steady state productivity growth rate of
the economy is aected by ination. As shown in Slavtcheva (2010), xed and exi-
ble exchange rate regimes result in dierent steady-state ination and, consequently
dierent steady state values of productivity growth and the other real variables in
the economy. Due to the presence of reserves, monetary policy is nonneutral in the
long term. The short term eects of monetary policy due to the presence of reserves
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are, however, very small. Thus, in order to analyze the dierences of the short-run
responses of the economy under xed and exible exchange rate regimes, this paper
also introduces nominal price rigidities which take the form of a real quadratic cost
of price adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982).
The results show that when there is a positive technology shock in the economy,
the number of entrants in the economy increases and this leads to a larger number
of producing entrepreneurs and, thus, to higher productivity growth. Deposits and
foreign borrowing increase after the shock as entrants need more loans to nance
innovation. As a result of higher entry of entrepreneurs in the home country, labor
reallocates from production to innovation. Output increases on impact due to the
larger number of entrepreneurs. The model predicts that the increase in entry, growth,
output and consumption are larger when the home country has a exible exchange
rate regime. The reason for this is that the cost of borrowing that entering innovators
have to pay to the intermediary is lower under the exible regime due to lower real
interest rates.
When the foreign interest rate increases, there is a reduction of entrants in the
home economy and eventually lower number of rms. Labor reallocates from innova-
tion to productions and deposits are reduced to match the lower demand for loans.
Productivity growth falls but as the shock dissipates, it returns to trend. In addition,
domestic output and consumption fall. The reduction in the number of entrants and
growth is smaller under the xed regime, however, the reduction of consumption and
output is higher under the xed exchange rate regime. Under a exible exchange
rate regime, there is a sharp increase in ination, which reduces prots of entrepre-
neurs and, thus, entry falls signicantly. Under the xed regime the real interest rate
increases substantially and, thus, both output and consumption fall more after the
shock.
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Thus, the model predicts that after an exogenous domestic technology shock,
the xed exchange rate regime contributes to smaller consumption volatility and
higher welfare compared to a exible exchange rate regime. When the economy is
subject to a foreign nominal interest rate shock, the volatility of consumption is lower
but, surprisingly, welfare is also lower under the exible regime due to the higher
volatility of labor and the lower steady state growth rate in this case. Therefore, after
both shocks analyzed here, welfare is higher under the xed exchange rate regime.
Similarly, Slavtcheva (2010) nds that in the long run a xed exchange rate regime
leads to higher welfare relative to a exible regime.
Several papers have developed dynamic general equilibriummodels of the choice of
exchange rate regime in the presence of credit market frictions between borrowers and
lenders. Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007),
and Faia and Monacelli (2002) are a few examples. In these papers, the objective is to
nd which exchange rate regime mitigates the propagation of shocks to the economy.
The results show that exible exchange rates are usually associated with lower output
drops given an adverse foreign interest rate shock to the economy. However, these
papers do not analyze the eect of exchange rate regimes on growth or the impact of
low level of nancial development. Therefore, the current paper could be considered
as an extension of their analyses, allowing for productivity growth and low level of
nancial development. My paper also ts in the literature that analyzes business
cycles in developing countries, such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Neumeyer and
Perri (2005), Guajardo (2008) and Comin et al. (2009). It is also related to Comin
and Gertler (2006), who combine productivity growth and real business cycle shocks
but do not consider exchange rate regimes or nancial development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 shows the steady state of the model, the calibration of the parameters, as well as
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the results I obtain for the eect of alternative exchange rate regimes on growth and
other macroeconomic variables given a productivity shock and a shock to the foreign
interest rate. It also shows second moments and welfare calculated from the model.
Section 4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The main contribution of this paper is extending the model introduced in Slavtcheva
(2010) by adding nominal price rigidity in order to analyze the short-run eects of
shocks in the economy. The main features of the model are the following: this is
a small open economy model with nominal price rigidity, endogenous productivity
growth, and a role for nancial development. Productivity growth is result of an
increase in the number of varieties of intermediate goods as in Romer (1990) and
Grossman and Helpman (1989).20 The home country has ve types of agents: workers,
entrepreneurs, nal goods producers, a nancial intermediary, and the government.
Workers in the home country supply labor, save, and consume home and foreign
tradable goods. I consider the case of bond trading, where households trade a foreign
currency denominated bond. Entrepreneurs produce home intermediate goods and
innovate by increasing the number of varieties of intermediate goods. Final goods
producers combine competitively the intermediate goods produced by entrepreneurs
into a nal consumption bundle. The role of the government is to determine monetary
policy given the exchange rate regime in the country. The nancial intermediary links
borrowers and lenders by accepting deposits from workers and lending to entrepre-
neurs, keeping part of the deposits as reserves. The nancing of innovation is subject
20An alternative productivity growth model is the increase in the quality of goods model as in
Aghion and Howitt (1992). The Romer (1990) model is used here because it is better suited for
quantitative analysis.
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to an information asymmetry. To overcome the information asymmetry in lending,
the nancial intermediary monitors innovating entrepreneurs by paying a monitor-
ing cost. The size of this cost represents the level of nancial development of the
country, where a high monitoring cost is associated with an underdeveloped nancial
system. Price rigidity is in the form of a real quadratic cost of price adjustment as in
Rotemberg (1982).
3.2.1 Consumption and Price Indexes
The workers in the home country consume a consumption basket  composed of
home and foreign traded goods,  and  given by:
 =
h

1

1

 + (1 )
1

1


i 
1
 (57)
where   0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and 
is the share of the home good in the consumption basket.
The corresponding price index is:
 = [
1
 + (1 ) 1 ]
1
1  (58)
where  and  are the prices of the home and foreign traded goods in terms of
the home currency. I assume that the law of one price and purchasing power parity
hold. The price of foreign goods in domestic currency is the nominal exchange rate
multiplied by the price of foreign goods in foreign currency:
 = 

 (59)
73
where  is the nominal exchange rate, and  , is the foreign currency price of foreign
goods, which is assumed exogenous.
3.2.2 Home Country
Workers The workers consume the consumption basket , and supply labor 
at nominal wage 	. They trade a foreign currency denominated nominal bond, 1
They also make domestic currency denominated deposits 
 to the domestic nancial
intermediary at a gross interest rate 1 +  paid at + 1 Workers choose  
 1
and  to maximize:
 = 
X
=0

³
ln  
2
2
´
 (60)
subject to the budget constraint:
+
+ 1+
2
2

12

	+(1+ 1)
1+ (1+ 1)11++ (61)
where  are government transfers,  are prots from ownership of the domestic
nancial intermediary,  is the nominal exchange rate and 1+1 is the gross nominal
interest paid on bonds. Log utility from consumption is chosen to ensure balanced
growth as shown by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). The presence of the term
!
2

"2
	
ensures that zero is the unique steady-state of bond holdings and that bonds
will return to this level after temporary shocks to the economy. In equilibrium, !
2

"2
	
will be transferred back to the workers.
The rst-order condition for labor supply is:
 =
	

 (62)
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The consumption allocation is:


=

1 
μ


¶
 (63)
The Euler equations for deposits is:

"
(1 + )
μ
+1

¶1

+1
#
= 1 (64)
There is an Euler equation for bonds and a non-arbitrage condition between the return
on bonds and deposits:
(1 +
21

) = 
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 )
μ
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 (65)
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Final Goods Sector A representative rm in the nal good sector produces the
nal home good  using labor  and  dierent varieties of intermediate goods
() supplied by entrepreneurs indexed by . The production function is:
 = 
1

Z 	
0
()
 0    1 (67)
where  is exogenous productivity and  is labor used for production. The nal
good rm buys intermediate goods () and produces the nal good in order to
maximize prots, taking the price of intermediate goods () as given. This yields
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the demand for intermediate good :
() =
()
1
1R 	
0
()

1
 (68)
The demand for labor is:
 =
(1 )
	
 (69)
Endogenous growth is a result of increase in the number of intermediate goods
 In equilibrium all intermediate goods are used in the same quantity and the
production function can be written as:
 = 
1
 
 = 
1
 ()
1  (70)
As shown by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2001), for given and ,  increases
with . This is a result of spreading the total of intermediate goods over the number
of varieties  If the increase in  is a result of increase in  for given 
there exist diminishing returns to each intermediate good
Entrepreneurs There are  entrepreneurs indexed by  Each entrepreneur pro-
duces one variety of intermediate goods using  units of the nal home good. The
number of intermediate good varieties increases as a result of costly innovation. In-
novation is conducted using labor 
(). Each entrepreneur has a probability
of innovation (
()) where  is a proxy for the disembodied quantity of
knowledge as in Blackburn and Hung (1996). I assume that 0(
())  0 and
00(
())  0, meaning that the probability of innovation increases with the
amount of research eort at a diminishing rate as in Jones (1995) and Stokey (1995).
This specication of the probability of innovation allows for sustainable productivity
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growth because 
() is constant on the balanced growth path. When the num-
ber of innovators increases, the demand for labor in research rises and, as a result,
the labor each individual innovator can hire decreases proportionately. Even though
each innovator employs less labor, overall the total labor used by all innovators stays
the same.
Production of intermediate goods The entrepreneurs have perpetual
monopoly power over their variety. Their unit cost of production is 

. I assume
that there is nominal price rigidity and prices are set subject to a real quadratic cost
of price adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982), so that monetary policy aects the real
variables in the economy in the short run. The cost of price adjustment is:
() =

2
μ
()
1()
 1
¶2
()

() (71)
It represents the cost of purchasing materials required to implement the price adjust-
ment and  is the gross steady-state ination rate in producer prices (). For
entrepreneurs, who initially set the price of their newly produced varieties, 1()
represents the notional price they would have set at   1 if they had been produc-
ing during that period as in Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007).21 The Rotemberg
quadratic cost of price adjustment is introduced instead of the commonly used Calvo
(1993) pricing in order to eliminate price heterogeneity between rms that have en-
tered the economy in dierent periods again following Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz
(2007). In steady-state the term (#)
1(#)
 1 becomes zero, so that the price ad-
justment cost is zero, corresponding to exible prices. In this way, the steady state of
the exible price and the nominal price rigidity models coincide. The real prot gen-
21Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007) show that the quantitative dierences from allowing new
entrants to price in exible fashion are negligible for realistic average rates of entry.
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erated by producing an intermediate good at time  () in this case equals output
revenues net of labor costs and the price adjustment cost. It is given by:
() =
()

() 

() 
2
μ
()
1()
 1
¶2
()

() (72)
The optimal price is a markup )() over marginal cost, where
)() 
1


1 
2
³
(#)
1(#)
 1
´2¸
+ (1 )
 (73)
 (#)1(#)
³
(#)
1(#)
1
´


+1
$+1(#)
$(#)

+1
³
+1(#)
(#)
´2 ³
+1(#)
(#)
1
´¸

Entry The presence of positive prots () attracts  entrants to the inter-
mediate good sector during period . These entrepreneurs know that they need to
innovate successfully in period  in order to produce a new variety and earn prots
Production of the varieties invented during period  takes place in  + 1 Given the
probability of innovation is (
()) only (
()) of the entrants will
survive and produce in period  + 1 In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs are identical
and I can write the evolution of the number of rms by:
+1 =  + (
) (74)
Innovation During period  newly entering entrepreneurs hire labor to be used
for innovation. The cost of inventing new varieties is nanced by loans !() from
the nancial intermediary:
!() = "
() (75)
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where " is the real wage. I assume that all external nance is in the form of the loan
!() obtained from the local nancial intermediary because the nancial frictions
prevent entrepreneurs from raising funds in an equity market. The expected net
return from innovation is:
(
())

+1

( ()#())
¸
 (76)
where #() is the loan repayment for entrepreneurs entering in period , and  ()
is the expected discounted prot of entrepreneur  dened above. In equilibrium,
(
())

+1

( ()#())
¸
= 0 (77)
i.e., there is free entry in the entrepreneurial sector until the present discounted
value of future prots is equated to the cost of innovating. Since each period the
entrepreneurs earn prots () the maximum amount they can repay each period
is (). Therefore the loan !() is repaid in installments of () each period 3
from + 1 on. The demand for loans is obtained by maximizing (76) subject to the
constraints of the loan contract that will be described in the next section.
Financial Intermediary The nancial intermediary collects deposits from domes-
tic households and provides loans to domestic entrepreneurs who nance their inno-
vations. The deposits and loans are denominated in domestic currency. The outcome
of the innovation process is known to the entrepreneur but not known to the nancial
intermediary, so there is an agency problem between the intermediary and entre-
preneurs. To overcome the agency problem, the intermediary solves a costly state
verication problem which requires that the intermediary pay a monitoring cost in
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order to observe the realization of the innovation. As shown by Townsend (1979)
and Williamson (1987), the optimal contract in this case is a standard debt contract.
When the borrowers default, the intermediary monitors them. For loans taken in
period  the monitoring occurs in  + 1 When the borrowers do not default, they
repay #(). The repayment amount depends on the monitoring cost that the in-
termediary incurs in bankruptcy states. In this paper the monitoring cost will be
used as a proxy for nancial development. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), and
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003), and the empirical evidence I presented in Slavtcheva
(2010) show that such costs are negatively correlated with nancial development.
The contract that overcomes the asymmetric information between the entrepreneurs
and the intermediary maximizes the expected return to the borrower subject to a
participation constraint of the intermediary. Thus, the optimal contract determines

() to maximize (76), subject to:
(
() )
+1

#() [1 (
() )]$!() = !()(1 +#+1) (78)
!() = "
() (79)
where $ is the monitoring cost of the nancial intermediary.22 Equation (76) shows
that the expected return to the entrepreneur is the return to innovation in the non-
defaulting states minus the repayment amount. Equation (78) is the participation
constraint for the intermediary and equates the repayment in the non-defaulting state
minus the monitoring cost incurred in the default state to the return to loans if no
asymmetric information problem was present !()(1 +#+1)
22The probability of monitoring in my model is 1 because the return to the borrower in the default
state is 0 and there is an incentive to misrepresent the outcome unless there is monitoring.
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The rst-order condition to the above maximization is given by:
0(
() ) [ ()
³
+1

´
+$"
()] =
" [(1 +#+1) + (1 (
())$]  (80)
It shows the amount of labor that the th innovator will use, and equates the expected
marginal cost and marginal revenue from innovating. The participation constraint
(78) then gives the repayment amount that the innovator should pay in the case of
a successful innovation. The return (1 + #+1) is determined by the intermediary
prot maximization.
Each period the intermediary receives deposits 
 from workers. A fraction 
of deposits are kept at the central bank as required reserves % while the rest of the
deposits are lent to entrepreneurs and earn real return (1 + #+1). The required
reserves % do not earn interest so that the real return to holding reserves is inversely
related to ination. Reserves are present in the model in order for the long-run
growth rate, & to depend on ination in steady state and thus monetary policy to
be non-neutral in the long-run, which is necessary to obtain the long-run results in
Slavtcheva (2010).
The nancial intermediary earns (1 + #+1) on loans, 1+1 on reserves and
repays (1 + '+1) to workers at time + 1 for deposits made at time . Therefore
the prots of the intermediary at time + 1 expressed in real terms are:
(1 +#+1)! +
%
+1
(1 + '+1) (81)
where    , 1 + '+1 = (1 + ) +1 is the gross real interest rate on deposits.
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Therefore, the real return to holding reserves in the steady state is inversely related
to ination and, as a result, the long run growth rate of the economy, &, depends on
ination, and, correspondingly, monetary policy.
The intermediary chooses its portfolio of loans and reserves that maximize its
prot subject to the feasibility constraint and the reserve requirement constraint:
%

+!   (82)
and
%

    (83)
Since reserves are rate-of-return dominated by loans, the reserve requirement con-
straint binds. As a result of the zero prot condition for the intermediary and equa-
tions (82) and (83) holding with equality,
(1 +#+1) =
(1 + '+1) (1+	+1)
1 
 (84)
The return to deposits (1 + '+1) is a weighted average of the return to loans
(1 + #+1) and the return to reserves 1(1++1 )
, where the weight is the reserve
requirement ratio  and 
%
 =

1
 1 is the ination rate
3.2.3 Symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium all entrepreneurs make identical decisions, so I drop the
 subscript from the entrepreneur variables. Aggregate output is used for home and
foreign consumption, for production of intermediate goods, and to pay the monitoring
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cost [1 (
11)]1$"1
1 and the price adjustment cost:
= +

+[1 (
11)] 1$"1
1+ + 
(85)
The total amount of loans in the economy plus the amount of reserves is equal to the
total amount of deposits:
! +
%

=  (86)
where    . The total amount of labor demanded is equal to total labor supply:
 +
 =  (87)
The government budget constraint is
%  %1 +
2
2

12

=  (88)
3.2.4 Monetary Policy
In the short run, the government conducts monetary policy by controlling the nominal
interest rate.
Under a xed exchange rate regime, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest
rate in order to keep the nominal exchange rate xed at a predetermined level, i.e.
 =  for all  (89)
Under the exible exchange rate regime, the central bank implements an ination
targeting rule, where the nominal interest rate adjusts to deviations of CPI ination
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from its steady-state level. The rule can be summarized as:
 = 4
%
  (90)
where 4  1 I assume that the central bank credibly commits to this interest rate
rule.
3.3 Model Solution
3.3.1 Steady State
In steady state, exogenous productivity  is constant. Since the expected discounted
prots equal the innovation cost, there is positive entry in steady state. Given that
the probability of innovation is a non zero constant in steady state, the number of
rms in the economy, consumption, output, the number of entrants, deposits and the
real wage grow at a constant rate &. I assume that  = 1 Also, the terms of trade
are normalized to 1 in steady state, i.e.  = . Therefore  = 1 and
 = (1*) Also  =  due to balanced trade in steady state. The steady-
state values coincide with the ones obtained in Slavtcheva (2009). This paper shows
that steady-state ination is dierent for xed and exible exchange rate regimes. In
the exible exchange rate regime ination and the reserve ratio in steady state are
set by the government which maximizes the utility of households such that it receives
a certain amount of seigniorage revenue. In the xed regime, quarterly ination is
0.017 and equals the ination in the foreign country, while the reserve ratio is the
same as under the exible exchange rate regime. Since ination is dierent in the two
regimes, productivity growth and the rest of the variables have dierent steady-state
values.
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3.3.2 Calibration
In the baseline calibration I set the discount factor  = 099 and interpret periods
as quarters. The intermediate good share in nal output production is  = 05
The entrepreneurs produce one variety of intermediate goods using  = 1 units of
output.23 The steady-state level of labor eort is 1. I calibrate the model to match
characteristics of a cross-section of countries with exible exchange rate regime and
low level of nancial development (private credit/GDP22%). These countries are
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Peru, and Sri Lanka. I calibrate the monitor-
ing cost, $ to equal the overhead ratio of banks, which is the ratio of bank overhead
costs to total assets. It is 0.0656 in the data (Financial Structure Database).24 The
elasticity of new intermediate goods with respect to innovation expenses is 0.9933
and the weight of the disutility of labor in the period utility function is 0.713. 25 I
set the elasticity of substitution for the consumption composite, , at 0.5. The share
of domestic goods in the consumption composite, , is 0.6, consistent with observed
shares. The scale parameter 2 in the cost of adjusting bond holdings is 0.00025. The
price stickiness parameter  is 12, which corresponds to a 0.75 probability of not
adjusting prices, standard in the literature.
In the case of a exible exchange rate regime, ination and the fraction of deposits
held as reserves are obtained endogenously in the model, as shown in Slavtcheva
(2010). Ination equals 0.078 and the fraction of reserves is 0.258. The corresponding
steady-state productivity growth, &, is 1.0020 In the case of a xed exchange rate
regime ination is 0.017, the fraction of reserves is 0.258 and productivity growth is
1.0027. The interest rate rule coecient on CPI ination, 4  is 15
23The value of  does not change the results, so it has been arbitrarily set to 1.
24I follow Bose and Murshid (2008) and calibrate the monitoring cost as bank overhead costs.
Also, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) use this as a measure of the cost of nancial intermediation.
25These values are obtained my matching values for productivity growth, probability of innovation,
reserves and ination from the data, as in Slavtcheva (2010).
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3.3.3 Impulse responses
In this section I compute the impulse responses to productivity and foreign interest
rate shocks. Due to positive growth in steady state, the number of rms in the
economy, consumption, output, the number of entrants, deposits and the real wage
are nonstationary. I normalize these variables by the number of varieties  and then
nd the rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation around the
steady state and obtain the recursive equilibrium law of motion using the method of
undetermined coecients.
Productivity shock In this case I consider the responses of the economy to a one
time temporary 1 percent increase in exogenous productivity A with persistence 0.9.
Flexible Exchange rates The results are shown in Figure 1. I only plot the
responses of the stationary variables.
The increase in exogenous productivity attracts entry of new entrepreneurs who
expect higher prots from innovation. Over time the number of producing entrepre-
neurs,  increases. As a result, productivity growth, g, is higher after the shock.
Deposits and foreign borrowing increase after the shock as entrants need more loans
to nance innovation. As a result of higher entry of entrepreneurs in the home coun-
try, labor reallocates from production to innovation. Output increases as well due
to the increase in  . Consumption of home goods also increases. Prices of home
goods fall and foreign goods become relatively more expensive causing net exports to
increase. CPI ination in the home country, labelled CPI in Figure 1, falls and the
central bank responds by lowering the nominal interest rate. Investment as a share
of output and net exports/output increase after the shock. The results show that
the ratio of consumption to output, * , falls on impact, meaning that consumption
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responds less that output. Due to the presence of endogenous growth in the model,
the responses of most variables persist beyond the duration of the exogenous shock.
Gradually, as the technology shock subsides, the number of entrants is reduced and
 goes back to trend but does not return to its original steady-state level. The same
happens with all other variables that exhibit trend in steady state.
Fixed Exchange rates The results are shown in Figure 2. The main dierence
between the impulse responses in Figure 1 and 2 is that under the xed exchange
rate regime the nominal interest rate is tied to the foreign interest rate and remains
unchanged. The price of foreign goods does not change either so that CPI ination
in the home country falls more under the xed regime. As a result, the real interest
rate is higher under the xed regime and thus, borrowing for innovation, entry, and,
consequently, productivity growth are lower than under the exible regime. Therefore,
the role of the xed exchange regime is to mitigate the impact of the exogenous
productivity growth.
Foreign Interest Rate shock Here, I consider the responses of the economy to
a one time temporary 1 percent increase in the foreign nominal interest rate with
persistence 0.9.
Flexible Exchange rates I plot the results in Figure 3. The rise in the
nominal foreign interest rate causes a depreciation of the domestic currency and
makes foreign goods more expensive in the home country so that domestic demand of
foreign goods decreases and, therefore, total domestic consumption falls. The foreign
country demand for home goods, however, increases and, as a result, net exports
increase. Since foreign good prices increase in the home country, CPI increases. The
government raises the nominal interest rate in response to higher ination. The real
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interest rate falls on impact. As domestic ination increases, prots of entrepreneurs
fall and this leads to a reduction of entrants in the economy and eventually to lower
number of rms. Labor reallocates from innovation to productions and deposits are
reduced to match the lower demand for loans. Productivity growth falls but as the
shock dissipates, it returns to trend.
Fixed Exchange rates The results are shown in Figure 4. When the foreign
nominal interest rate rises, the domestic nominal interest rate increases as well so that
the uncovered interest parity holds. The real interest rate also increases. Domestic
consumption is reduced as the real interest rate increases and the reduction of con-
sumption is much higher than under exible exchange rates due to the signicant rise
in the real interest rate. Domestic output falls and the demand for intermediate goods
is lower. Thus, prots of entrepreneurs are reduced and entry of new entrepreneurs
is lower. As a result, the number of producing entrepreneurs falls and, consequently,
productivity growth falls slightly on impact. The reduction in productivity growth is
smaller that under the exible regime and later goes back to trend. Labor reallocates
from innovation to productions and deposits are reduced to match the lower demand
for loans. The price of foreign goods is unchanged but their relative price is higher
so that net exports increase after the shock.
3.3.4 Macroeconomic Volatility
In order to assess how well the model replicates stylized business cycle facts for de-
veloping countries, I calculate second moments generated from the model. These
moments are calculated as follows. After I solve for the stationary variables, I add
the trend g to the number of varieties  , consumption , output   and invest-
ment which equals the loans made to entrepreneurs. Then I simulate the model 100
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times, lter the resulting series using an HP lter with smoothness parameter 1600
and obtain the resulting numerical moments. To calculate the second moments, I
set the persistence of the productivity shock to 0.95, the persistence of the foreign
interest rate shock to 0.81, the standard deviation of the productivity shock to 0.0147
and the standard deviation of the interest rate shock to 0.0063. These values are
estimates of the persistence and standard deviation of shocks in developing countries
(see Neumeyer and Perri, 2005).
I compare the model moments with empirical moments provided by Guajardo
(2008), who calculates second moments of output, consumption and investment for
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and Sri Lanka. I calculate the average sec-
ond moments for this group of countries and compare them to the second moments
obtained from the model.
The model and empirical second moments are shown in Tables 1-3. Table 1
shows the results for both a exible and xed exchange rate regime when there is a
domestic productivity shock. The model standard deviations of output, consumption,
and investment under the exible regime are 1.82, 0.91, and 13.09, respectively. The
corresponding moments in the case of a xed regime are 1.14, 0.53, and 7.35, which
means that the xed exchange rate regime produces a smaller volatility as a response
to an exogenous domestic productivity shock.
Table 2 show the empirical moments for output, consumption and investment,
3.51, 3.91, and 13.05, respectively. Comparing the empirical moments to the model
generated moments under the exible regime, we see that the empirical volatility of
output and consumption is higher that the one obtained from the model, while the
volatility of investment is similar in the data and model. The exible exchange rate
model generates higher endogenous persistence of variables and produces variables
too procyclical relative to the data.
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Table 3 corresponds to the case of a foreign interest rate shock. This table reveals
that the volatility of consumption and output is lower under the exible regime,
while the volatility of investment is higher given the exible regime. Also, in this case
the volatility of consumption is higher than the volatility of output consistent with
evidence by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
3.3.5 Welfare Analysis
Here I evaluate how the alternative exchange rate regimes aect welfare. I calculate
welfare as the expected discounted second order Taylor expansion of agents utility.
Using the utility function in (60), the welfare criterion becomes:
	 =
1
(1 )

ln


+
 ln &
(1 ) 

2
2  1
2
 5'( b) 
2
2 5'( b)¸  (91)
where bars correspond to steady-state levels of variables that are not constant in
steady state. Variables without time subscripts denote constant steady state levels,
while the variables with hat are percent deviation from the steady-state (see derivation
in the Appendix). To obtain this welfare function, I assume that initial 0 = 1
Given this assumption, I calculate the percent change in steady-state consumption,
i.e. * , under the exible exchange rate regime that would make households as
well o as under the xed exchange rate regime26. I nd that when there is a domestic
productivity shock, welfare is higher under the xed regime due to the lower volatility
of consumption and higher steady state growth g. In this case, a 3.7% increase of
steady-state consumption under the exible regime will make the household as well
o as under the xed regime. Most of the welfare gain under the xed regime is
26I use 	 instead of  because 	 in constant in steady state. Another paper that
calculates welfare in the case of non-stationary consumption is Kim et al. (2001).
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due to higher growth as the lower volatility of consumption under the xed regime is
oset by higher labor volatility27.
Given a foreign nominal interest shock, welfare is again higher under the xed
regime even though the volatility of consumption is lower given the exible exchange
rate regime. I nd that 3.69% increase of steady-state consumption under the exible
regime will make the exible regime welfare the same as the xed regime welfare.
This result can be explained by the fact that labor volatility is lower and the steady
state growth g is higher under the xed regime, thus, compensating for the higher
volatility of consumption. Again in this case, welfare is higher under the xed regime
because steady state growth is higher, while the higher volatility of consumption is
cancelled out by the lower volatility of labor under the xed regime.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eect of exchange rate regimes on the macroeconomic perfor-
mance of a small open economy with endogenous productivity growth and underde-
veloped nancial markets. I consider the responses of the economy to an exogenous
domestic technology shock and a shock to the foreign nominal interest rate. The
results show that when there is a positive exogenous technology shock, the number
of entrants, output, consumption and productivity growth increase both with xed
and exible exchange rate regimes. The increase in entry, output and consumption
are larger given a exible exchange rate regime as the shock is mitigated under the
xed exchange rate regime. When there is an increase in the foreign nominal interest
rate, entry, productivity growth, output and consumption are reduced. In this case,
27If volatilities of consumption and labor are 0, welfare under the xed regime is 3.7 % higher. This
welfare gain is based on the quarterly calibration of the model, shown above. If annual calibration
is used, the welfare gain is 2.3% coinciding with the result in Slavtcheva (2010).
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the reduction in the number of entrants and growth is smaller under the xed regime,
however, the reduction of consumption and output is higher under the xed exchange
rate regime. Finally, I report second moments and welfare. I nd that after both
shocks analyzed here, welfare is higher under the xed exchange rate regime. The
model is also able to match some features of business cycles in developing countries.
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Figure 1: Flexible Exchange Rate, Productivity Shock, shock persistence 0.9
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Figure 2: Fixed Exchange Rate, Productivity Shock, shock persistence 0.9
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Figure 3: Flexible Exchange Rate, Foreign Nominal Interest Rate Shock, shock persistence 0.9
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Figure 4: Fixed Exchange Rate, Foreign Nominal Interest Rate Shock, shock persistence 0.9
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Table 1: Moments for Model with Flexible exchange rates vs Model with Fixed
exchange rates, persistence of productivity shock 0.95
Model Model Model Model Model Model
Flex ER Fix ER Flex ER Fix ER Flex ER Fix ER
Variable X 6& [//1] corr (/ 788)
Output 1.82 1.14 0.80 0.93 1 1
Consumption 0.91 0.53 0.78 0.93 0.99 0.98
Investment 13.09 7.35 0.72 0.66 0.98 0.55
Table 2: Data Moments
Variable X 6& [//1] corr (/ 788)
Output 3.51 0.66 1
Consumption 3.91 0.78
Investment 13.05 0.58 0.65
Source for data moments: Guajardo (2008)
Table 3: Moments for Model with Flexible exchange rates vs Model with Fixed
exchange rates, persistence of interest rate shock 0.81
Model Flex ER Model Fix ER
Variable X 6&
Output 0.42 1.16
Consumption 1.50 2.11
Investment 20.94 10.82
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3.5.1 Derivation of Welfare citerion
I show the derivation of the welfare criterion. A second order Taylor expansion of a
function T(x,y) around the point (a,b) is:
 (, ) = 9(5 :) + (, 5)9(5 :) + (  :)9$(5 :) +
1
2
£
(, 5)29(5 :) + 2(, 5)(  :)9$(5 :) + (  :)29$$(5 :)
¤
Thus the second order Taylor expansion of the period utility function around the
steady state is:
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
where bars correspond to steady-state levels of variables that are not constant in
steady state. Variables without time subscripts denote constant steady state levels.
Taking expectations, this expression becomes:
ln  
2
2  1
2
 5'( b) 
2
2 5'( b)
where the variables with hat are percent deviation from the steady-state.
Since steady-state consumption  is nonstationary, I follow Kim et al. (2001)
and transform consumption to obtain a stationary variable:
ln

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+ ln   
2
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2
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2
2 5'( b)
where 
	
is constant,  is constant and   grows at a constant rate & Thus   =
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0&
 Assuming 0 = 1 the second order Taylor expansion of the period utility
function becomes:
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2
2 5'( b)
Thus the welfafe criterion is:
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I show the derivation of
X
=0
 below:
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I apply L’Hopital’s rule to lim


(1)

( 1 )

¸
and calculate derivatives of the
numerator and denominator of 
(1)

( 1 )
 with respect to n.
The result is:
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